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PREFACE 
This paper was presented at the IIASA conference on the 
Practice and Prospect of Multiregional Economic Modeling, held 
in Laxenburg, Austria, on November 25-27, 1981. The conference 
marked the close of a project aimed at providing a world-wide 
survey of the current practice of multiregional economic model- 
building and a review of the major development trends. 
A more detailed description of the models discussed in this 
paper is to be found in an IIASA Collaborative Paper 'A Review 
of Multiregional Economic Models', CP-82-7. Shortened versions 
of both papers will appear in a book entitled 'Practice and 
Prospect of Multiregional Economic Modeling' to be published 
in the summer of 1982. 
Boris Issaev 
Leader 
Regional Development 
Group 

ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the contribution of multiregional models 
to the study of the effectiveness of regional policies. A survey 
of the instruments and objectives included in multiregional 
models is presented. Special attention Is paid to the effective- 
ness of public expenditures, investment subsidies, and investment 
in infrastructure. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, policy analysis has been increasingly 
focussed on assessing the impacts of public policies (see, among 
others, Pleeter 1980). This development has also taken place 
in a regional and multiregional context. 
Multiregional economic models have been developed in manv 
countries during the last decades. These models contain a 
more or less comprehensive description of the economic structure 
of regions, the interrelationships among regions, and/or the 
interrelationships between regions and the national economy. Some 
multiregional economic models also contain links to other sectors 
such as energy, pollution, and demographic developments. 
Regional policies deal with problems of interregional equity, 
efficiency, and the unintended or undesirable side-effects of spa- 
tial developments; consequently, multiregional models are a poten- 
tially useful tool for preparing these policies. This paper will 
be devoted to an analysis of the use of multiregional models in 
regional policy making. For an analysis of the effectiveness of 
policies in a purely regional context, see Folmer (1980) and Moore 
and Rhodes (1974) among others. The extent to which these models 
have been used to study the effectiveness of regional policies is 
discussed and this naturally requires a closer examination of the 
concept of effectiveness in a spatial context, which is the subject 
of section 2. 
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The information on the multiregional models is based on the 
results of a comparative study carried out at IIASA (Laxenburg) 
and the Free University (Amsterdam). In addition to the general 
information on this study contained in Nijkamp and Rietveld (1980) 
and Rietveld (1980), we refer to the brief survey of these models 
contained in Rietveld (1982). It is assumed that the reader is 
familiar with the information provided in this survey. 
Given this set of multiregional models, the extent to which 
these models include policy instruments designed to resolve cer- 
tain policy issues is considered. The choice of instruments and 
objectives is based on information provided by the model-builders 
themselves. 
The organization of this paper is as. follows. 
-- In section 2 the effectiveness concept is discussed 
from a methodological viewpoint. 
-- Section 3 is devoted to a survey of policy objectives 
and instruments included in multiregional models. 
-- In sections 4-6 the effectiveness of some policy instru- 
ments (in particular, public expenditures, investment 
subsidies, and investments in infrastructure) is discussed. 
-- Section 7 is devoted to the conclusions. 
2. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS USING 
MODELS 
This section will be devoted to an operationalization of 
the concept of effectiveness of instruments (based on the ideas of 
Kirschen et al. 1964, and Tinbergen 1956). The idea underlying 
this concept is that one should distinguish between the effects 
of policy instruments and of autonomous developments upon policy 
objectives. This requires a comprehensive representation of an 
economic system in which a distinction is made between objec- 
tives, instruments, and so-called data. Only in this way is it 
possible to indicate whether a change in policy objectives can 
be attributed to a certain policy or to autonomous.processes. 
Consider an economic system that is described by a model 
containing the following types of variables: 
w - = (wl , .. . ,wJ) I : objectives (or goal variables to 
be maximized) , 
X = (xl I . .  .,XI) 
- : intermediary variables (endogenous 
economic variables, but no objectives), 
y = (yl , .. . ,yM) ' : instruments, 
Z = (zl I . .  . , z * )  
- 
: autonomous variables (data), 
V = (vl,...,v*) 
- : non-economic side-effects (pollution, 
e.g.1. 
The relationships between objectives, intermediary varia- 
bles, instruments, data, and side-effects can be represented 
by means of the simple stimulus-response approach shown in. 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A stimulus-response model for policy analysis. 
Clearly, in a dynamic context this system might contain 
several feedback relationships. It should also be noted that 
in a spatial setting this system should be extended with spatial 
spillover effects and spatial interaction linkages-. 
Assume that the model concerned consists of a series of K inde- 
pendent equations: 
These equations describe various types of relationships between 
the variables, such as technical relationships, balance equations, 
behavioral patterns of various actors, definitions, etc. Non- 
economic side-effects are omitted for ease of presentation. 
It is assumed that a clear distinction between objectives, 
instruments, and intermediary variables can be made. However, 
it should be noted that in certain cases policy instruments may 
also have the character of an objective, or vice versa (see also 
section 3). This holds especially true in models with various 
policy levels or with several policy-making institutions. 
Another assumption is that the model is closed, which means 
that once y and - z are known, the values of w - can be uniquely 
determined. A necessary condition for such a calculation is 
that the number of endogenous variables (I + J) is equal to t.he 
number of equations (K) (see Tinbergen 1956) . 
When the model is linear, (2.1) can be written as: 
where A1 and A2 are matrices of order (K x K) and (K x (M + N)) , 
respectively; - c is a vector with K elements. In this case the 
solution of the model can be explicitly written in the reduced 
form (provided A1 is non-singular) : 
The effectiveness of an instrument m with regard to an objective 
1, ymj, is defined as the marginal change in instrument m, 
holding the other instruments and the exogenous variables con- 
* 
stant. 
* 
For non-linear models, it may be more appropriate to define 
effectiveness in terms of elasticities. Another advantage of using 
elasticities is that it makes the effectiveness measures comparable 
for all instruments and objectives, as well as for all regions. 
Note also that an implicit assumption underlying (2.1) is that 
the ceteris paribus condition holds. In some cases, however, this 
may not be a reasonable assumption, for example, when the effects 
of a policy package consisting of a mix of several instruments have 
to be studied (synergetic effects). 
Of course the effectiveness can also be defined in terms of 
infinitesimal small changes (partial derivatives) in instruments 
and variables. It is also clear that the effectiveness of an 
instrument variable is equally determined by the structure and 
characteristics of the model concerned. When a model is linear, 
such as in (2.3), ymi can directly be found when A;' and the 
relevant columns of A2 are known. Obviously, in the linear case, 
the value of y does not depend on the values of the instruments 
m j 
and autonomous variables. 
When a model is not linear, a straightforward reduced form 
can only be found in exceptional cases, so that another approach 
has to be adopted. A widely accepted approach is: 
(1) Determine reference values for the instruments and 
autonomous variables (g , - 8) and find by means of some 
numerical procedure the resulting values of the objec- 
tives ( 8 ) .  - 
(2) Formulate a policy variant in the following way. 
Let gm denote a unit vector of which the m-th element 
is equal to 1 and the other elements are 0. Repeat 
(1) for the values ($ + bym gm, 8) . The resulting 
value of the objectives is wm. - 
(3) Determine y the effectiveness of ym with respect to 
mj A 
w , as j (wmj - W. )/Aym. 3 
When this procedure has been repeated for all j and m, we arrive 
at the impact matrix described in Table 1, which can be considered 
as the central concept of this paper. 
Attention is now given to some subjects that deserve further 
clarification: 
1. the role of effectiveness measures in programming 
models; 
2. statistical aspects of effectiveness measures; 
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Table 1. Impact matrix for M instruments and J objectives. 
3. the way in which reference values for Y and - z can be 
determined; 
4. spatial aspects of effectiveness analysis. 
ad 1. When model (2.1 ) is used for programming purposes, 
it has to be extended with a maximand, and with political 
and other constraints : y E Y. Hence: 
max! w 
- 
This programming problem has been formulated here as 
a (rnultiobjective) vector maximization problem (see 
Rietveld 1980) to indicgte that the solution depends on 
I 
the weights to be attached to the w s. It is evident j 
that such political priorities also determine the use of 
instruments for the achievement of certain goals. The 
latter problem, however, is more related to policy analysis 
in general than to effectiveness analysis. 
From (2.5) , it is clear that the problem of evaluating 
a policy (e.g. by means of social cost-benefit analysis, 
strategic choice analysis, or multicriteria analysis) is 
broader than the problem of measurinq the effectiveness 
of a policy. The former problen presupposes the latter one, 
but also includes the problem of attaching appropriate 
weights to the policy objectives (including the costs of 
policy instruments). Consequently, in that case definite 
conclusions about the attractiveness of policy instruments 
may only be drawn when information about the weights of all 
policy objectives is available. This broader approach, 
however, falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Another observation regarding (2.5) is that many 
programming models do not focus so much on the effective- 
* 
ness of instruments (which is taken for granted), but more 
on the optimal solution as well ason thesensitivity of this 
solution to changes in the exogenous variables, the para- 
meters of the functions fk, and the weights of the objec- 
tives. 
* 
An alternative formulation that is often used in program- 
ming models is: 
max! w , 
- 
Y 
s.t. W. = W (y, z) , j j = l,...,J , -3 (b) 
9, ( y t  2) 2 0 1 l = 1 ,  ..., L . (c) 
In this formulation, intermediary variables do not play a role. 
The inequalities (c) refer to resource constraints, input-output 
relationships, political constraints, etc. Note that by means 
of (b) the effectiveness of y with respect to w can directly be 
- determined. 
A problem arising in many applications of such programming 
formulations is that z includes instruments that cannot directly 
be.controlled by the policy unit concerned. For example, in 
many market or mixed economies, policy units have no direct 
control of private investments. The obvious consequence is 
that programming models often yield overoptimistic conclusions 
concerning options for alternative 'policies. 
In this respect, the side-conditions y E Y from (2.5) 
may also include policy instruments (e.g. a system of envi- 
ronmental standards). The consequences (i.e. effectiveness) 
of imposing such constraints for the objectives can be 
studied by means of dual variables. 
-
ad 2. Statistical aspects of effectiveness measures have in 
general received little attention in the theory and practice 
of modeling. Obviously, this is an unsatisfactory situation, 
since several sources of uncertainty are present in economic 
modeling: measurement errors in variables, the stochastic nature 
of parameter values, omitted and latent variables, specification 
errors, and uncertainties about the future development of autono- 
mous variables. Only recently, the problems of the level of mea- 
surement of variables has received more attention in so-called 
soft or qualitative econometrics (see ~ijkamp and Rietveld 1982). 
Even In the case of linear models, it is- extremely 
difficult to draw conclusions in a formal analytical way 
about the statistical properties of the ymj. Therefore, 
Monte Carlo simulations are an obvious alternative (cf. 
Openshaw 1979), although one should be aware of their 
disadvantages, such as the costs of running a model 
several times. 
From a comparison of ex post with ex ante effectiveness 
-- -- 
analyses, it is clear that in the latter more uncertainties 
are involved than in the former. The additional uncertain- 
ties relate to (1) the future values of the autonomous 
variables and (2) the validity of the model for periods 
that have not been taken into account during the estimation 
phase. For instance, one may question the relevance of 
asymmetric economic behavior in a period of economic growth 
and of economic decline, especially when these models have 
been assessed during an economic 'upswing ' (see Ni j kamp 
1981). Both uncertainties may be relevant in multiregional 
models. For example, Courbis (1977) concludes that the 
effectiveness of certain investment stimulation policies in 
the REGINA model depends heavily on the values of the autono- 
mous variables. As an example of the second uncertainty, it 
should  be no ted  t h a t  most models have been e s t i m a t e d  f o r  
a  p e r i o d  w i t h  s t e a d y  growth ( s a y  t h e  p e r i o d  from 1 9 5 8  t o  
1 9 7 3 ) ,  s o  t h a t  t h e y  may be l e s s  u s e f u l  f o r  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  
i n  p e r i o d s  o f  s t a g n a t i o n  o r  f l u c t u a t i o n ;  t h e  behavior  
o f  m u l t i r e g i o n a l  economic models i n  a  pe r iod  of economic 
r e c e s s i o n  o r  sudden d i s t u r b a n c e s  i s  n o t  guaran teed  t o  be  
c o n s i s t e n t  ( c f .  a l s o  t h e  n o t i o n s  of  s t a b i l i t y  i n  c a t a s -  
t r o p h e  and b i f u r c a t i o n  t h e o r y ) .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  
spa t io t empora l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  an i n t e r r e g i o n a l  model i s  
ex t remely  impor tan t .  
ad 3 .  The de t e rmina t ion  o f  r e f e r e n c e  v a l u e s  f o r  i n s t rumen t s  
and autonomous v a r i a b l e s  Is i n  many c a s e s  n o t  s t r a i g h t -  
forward,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  dynamic models when 
s e v e r a l  p e r i o d s  a r e  involved.  Reference v a l u e s  f o r  auto-  
nomous v a r i a b l e s  can be ob t a ined  by us ing  o t h e r  models, 
e x t r a p o l a t i n g  t i m e  series ,  s u b j e c t i v e  gues se s ,  o r  a  combi- 
n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e .  Reference v a l u e s  f o r  i n s t rumen t s  a r e  based 
on t h e  n o t i o n  o f  no p o l i c y  a l t e r a t i o n s .  Such a n o t i o n  o f  
a r e f e r e n c e  a l t e r n a t i v e  is  n o t  an  unambiguous t e r m ,  however 
(see, f o r  example, Table  2 )  . 
Table  2 .  Government revenues  and expend i tu re s  measured i n  
r e a l  t e r m s .  
p e r i o d  
- - 
t + l  t + l  t + l  
t - 2  t - 1  t f o r e c a s t  po l i cy  p o l i c y  
1 2  
p u b l i c  expendi tures .  1 7 . 0  2 0 . 0  2 3 . 0  2 6 . 0  2 5 . 3  
t a x  r a t e  0 . 1 5  0 . 1 6  0 . 1 7  0 . 1 8  0 . 1 8  
t a x  base  1 0 0 . 0  1 1 0 . 0  1 1 0 . 0  1 1 0 . 0  1 1 0 . 0  1 1 0 . 0  
t a x  revenues  1 5 . 0  1 7 . 6  1 8 . 7  1 9 . 8  1 9 . 8  
budget  d e f i c i t  2 . 0  2 .4  4 . 3  6 . 2  5 . 5  
Table 2 c o n t a i n s  ( syn the t i c )  d a t a  on p u b l i c  expend i tu re s  
and t a x e s  i n  p r ev ious  p e r i o d s  a s  w e l l  a s  a  f o r e c a s t  f o r  t h e  
t a x  base  i n  t h e  nex t  pe r iod .  Po l i cy  1 is  based on e x t r a -  
p o l a t i n g  t h e  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  expend i tu re  and t h e  t a x  r a t e ,  
wh i l e  t h e  budget  d e f i c i t  f o l l ows  a s  a  r e s u l t .  P o l i c y  2 i s  
based on a  norm f o r  t h e  d e f i c i t / t a x  base  r a t i o  ( 5 % )  and an 
e x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  t a x  r a t e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  expendi-  
t u r e s  fo l lows  a s  a  r e s u l t .  W e  conclude t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  
t h e  t e r m  ' u n a l t e r e d  p o l i c y '  can be i n t e r ~ r e t e d  i n  s e v e r a l  
ways (see a l s o  de  Fa l l eux  e t  a l .  1975) . 
ad 4 .  The s p a t i a l  a s p e c t s  (such a s  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  s p i l l o v e r  
and i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t s )  o f  an  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  of  
p o l i c y  i n s t rumen t s  i n  a  m u l t i r e g i o n a l  model can f u r t h e r  
be  ana lyzed  by employing t h e  n o t i o n  of  decomposab i l i ty  
a s  a  formal  way o f  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  a  complex sys tem (see 
a l s o  Kuenne 19631 and Pae l inck  and Nijkamp 1976) . Suppose 
t h a t  a  s p a t i a l  sys tem is  composed of  R r eg ions .  Each r e g i o n  
can  be  r e p r e s e n t e d  by means of  a  model o f  t y p e  ( 2 . 1 ) .  I f  
t h e  implementat ion of policy instrumnts i n  a  c e r t a i n  r eg ion  
( r  = 1 , R  has  no e f f e c t s  on t h e  endogenous v a r i a b l e s  
and p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  ano the r  r e g i o n  r t ( r '  = 1 , .  . . , R ;  
r '  # r ) ,  t h e  s p a t i a l  sys tem i s  s a i d  t o  be s t r o n g l y  decom~o-  
s a b l e .  Th is  means e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  a l l  r e g i o n s  of  t h e  
s p a t i a l  system a t  hand a r e  independent  e n t i t i e s  w i t h  no 
s p a t i a l  s p i l l o v e r  e f f e c t s .  S t rong  decomposab i l i ty  i m p l i e s  
i n  formal terms: 
rr '  
'mj = o  , 
r r '  
where y r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  m-th i n s t r u -  
m j  
ment i n  r e g i o n  r w i t h  r ega rd  t o  t h e  j - th  o b j e c t i v e  i n  r eg ion  
r '  (see a l s o  Table 5 )  . 
S i m i l a r l y ,  one may d e f i n e  indecomposab i l i ty  a s  fo l l ows :  
r r '  Y m j  + 0 , 
which means t h a t  t h e  m u l t i r e g i o n a l  model a t  hand i s  e i t h e r  
an  i n t e r r e q i o n a l  model w i t h  l i n k s  among a l l  r e g i o n s  o f  t h a t  
(interdependent) system, or a national-regional model with 
links between the nationa1,system and the regions. In this 
respect, an input-output framework may provide a consistent 
approach. 
If the instruments of one region affect only in one 
direction the objectives of another region (or a set of 
other regions), which in turn may affect other regions, 
a (block-) triangular system can be created (this is a 
situation of a weak decomposability). For an analysis of 
such recursive systems, see also Malinvaud (1968) and 
Wold (1954). For a discussion of national-regional inter- 
dependencies the reader is referred to section 3. The 
obvious conclusion is that in an interdependent multire- 
gional model, the effectiveness of instruments can only be 
studied in a satisfactory way if the indecomposability of 
the spatial system is taken into account. 
It should also be mentioned that an effectiveness 
analysis in a geographical setting should take into account 
the scale of regions and sectors employed in the model, 
since the results may differ according to the size of 
regions and the number of sectors at hand. 
3. OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS IN MULTIREGIONAL ECONOMIC MODELS 
A comparative study of the effectiveness of instruments 
of multiregional models may be based on two different approaches: 
(1) a uniform approach in which for all models the same instru- 
ments and objectives are assumed, or (2) an individual approach 
in which for each model different instruments and objectives are 
allowed. The latter approach has been chosen here because there 
appears to be considerable variation in the choice of instruments 
and objectives across all models. This is evidently determined 
by the fact that the regional problems may be entirely different 
in many countries, so that many models have their own specific 
scope and aim. This would not permit a uniform approach, so that 
the individual approach appears to be a reasonable strategy. How- 
ever, no specific critical comments on each individual model can 
be made, since this would require a detailed long-term study of 
each mode1,which is impossible in a comparative study covering 
approximately 45 models. 
For the purpose of this international comparative study, it 
is important to indicate first the scope of multiregional econo- 
mic models. Which kinds of policy objectives and instruments 
are covered by them? The responses of approximately 45 model 
builders to a questionnaire concerning multiregional economic 
models were used to answer this question. 
One of the questions included in the questionnaire was: 
'Which policy goals/objectives are endogenous in the model (at 
the regional and/or national level) ?I. In approximately 31 
cases the response contained useful information. In several 
other models, policy instruments and/or objectives were not 
dealt with in an identifiable way, they were. therefore not 
considered. The frequency distribution of these responses is 
represented in Table 3. 
The most important socio-economic objectives are present 
in Table 3, although the frequencies of economic growth and 
labor market variables are clearly higher than those of the 
other socio-economic objectives. Policy objectives from related 
fields are only present to a moderate extent. It may therefore 
be concluded that in a strict sense multiregional economic models 
can only be used to a very limited extent to analyze the effects 
of policy instruments on energy, environmental, or physical 
planning objectives. Only when these models are linked with 
other models (e.g. environmental models) is an analysis of effec- 
tiveness in this sense feasible. 
With respect to the instruments, the following question has 
been posed: 'For which policy instruments or policy measures can 
the effects on the policy objectives be determined (at the regional 
and/or national level)?'. In 25 cases the response contained 
useful information. The frequency distribution is represented in 
Table 4. 
The main instruments in multiregional models can be found in 
the fields of government consumption expenditures, public invest- 
ments, and subsidies of private investments. Other instruments 
receiving some attention are taxes and employment in government 
services. Relatively little attention is paid to pricing policies 
Table 3. Frequency distribution of objectives in 31 multire- 
gional economic models. 
socio-econoniic objectives 
income, producticrn, consumption 
employment 
unemployment 
prices, inflation 
balance of payments 
income distribution 
budgetary objectives 
tax revenues, investment costs, budget deficit 
facilities 
infrastructure, utilities 
energy and environment 
energy consumption 
pollution 
physical planning objectives 
land use 1 
population distribution 4 
land prices I 
trip distribution I 
Table 4. Frequency distribution of instruments in 25 
multiregional economic models. 
government revenues and expenditures 
consumption expenditures 10 
employment in government services 3 
public investments 15 
flows between national and regional governments 3 
social security payments 1 
taxes 6 
prices 
subsidies of private investments 
wage subsidies 
average or minimum wage 
interest rate 
public prices 
transportation costs 
fuel prices 
physical planning 
housing 
environment 
pollution standards 
other instruments 
limits on productive age 1 
agricultural policies 1 
national immigration policies 2 
(apart from investment subsidies) and to instruments from related 
policy fields such as physical and environmental planning. These 
results also show the focus of model-building to be on the demand 
side (for instance, input-output export base and Keynesian 
demand theories). There is a serious lack of attention for supply 
policies. 
It is important to note that in many multiregional models it 
is far from easy to model in a straightforward way a certain 
policy measure. Many models lack appropriate policy handles (cf. 
Bolton 1980). For example, in several models, private invest- 
ments are treated as exogenous variables without any indication 
of how these investments react to subsidies. Yet if one wishes 
to study the effectiveness of these subsidies, either one has to 
link the multiregional model with a model dealing with investment 
behavior or one has to use the model in connection with some 
subjective guesses about the sensitivity of investments for 
subsidies. In this respect, there is a serious lack of infor- 
mation about the internal mechanism of a spatial system. 
This lack of policy handles in multiregional models is a 
clear indication that the language and concepts of regional 
policies cannot always easily be translated into the language 
and concepts of multiregional models (cf. Bogaert et al. 1979). 
De Falleur et al. (1975, p. 278), therefore claim that much 
attention should be paid to a consistent formulation of policy 
variants: '...the time spent in formulating a variant can be 
broken down as follows: 90 percent preparing and formulating 
the assumptions, 1 percent formulating the simulation, and 9 
percent analyzing the results'. 
Note that no distinction between national and regional objec- 
-
tives and instruments has been made. Instruments may be used at 
both a national and a regional level, while objectives may also 
be specified at both a national and a regional level, leading 
to complex linkages in a spatial system. So the majority of the 
objectives may function at both levels (exceptions are the balance- 
of-payments, inflation, and budgetary objectives of the national 
government), while the same holds true for the instruments (for 
example, an investment subsidy may be specified for an individual 
region, but it may also be uniformly applicable to all regions). 
Consequently, the impacts shown in Table 5 can in principle be 
covered by multiregional models. 
Table 5. Impact matrix for region-specific and uniform 
reqional instruments and objectives. 
region-specific national 
objectives objectives 
region-specific 
instruments 
uniform regional 
instruments 
The matrix hrr indicates the effects of regional policies 
on regional objectives. The matrix hrn indicates the (perhaps 
unintended) effects of regional policies on national objectives. 
The matrix hnr is the main interest of national policies, while 
hnr describes the (perhaps unintended) effects of national 
policies on specific regions. When dealing with the perfor- 
mance of a specific region, there is often a tendency to 
focus on hrr, but this is not always justifiable. There are 
several policy fields without an explicit regional orientation 
that may have strong differential &-npacts hnr (e. g. education, 
infrastructure, environmental standards, income and labor market 
policies). The same holds true for national capacity limits 
or national price policies. 
Top-down models are based on the assumption that the main 
national variables are given, or at least not determined as 
endogenous variables in a multiregional framework. They provide 
a feasible qrea within which regional trade-offs and allocations 
take place, although the regional distribution of activity will 
not affect the national totals. Hence, these models can only be 
used to study hrr and hnr. 
One might argue that A"" is already covered by national 
models, so that it can be deleted in the context of multire- 
gional models; this, however, is not necessarily true. Multi- 
regional models with a bottom-up structure or with national- 
regional interactions are in principle also suitable for this 
purpose and may even be more appropriate than national models 
in certain cases. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this section: 
1. Multiregional economic models are in most cases not 
sufficiently integrated to be used for analyzinp the 
effects - on or of - policy fields related to regional 
economic policy (such as physical or environmental 
planning). In these cases multiregional economic 
models can only be used for analyzing such effects 
if they are extended in that direction, linked with 
other models, or supplemented with expert information. 
2. In multiregional economic models relatively little 
attention is paid to pricinq policies (apart from invest- 
ment subsidies). The same holds true for the supply 
side (capacity limits on the labor or capital market, 
e.g.). Neglecting these elements may evidently lead 
to biased results in the effectiveness analysis, or to 
lack of insight into equilibrium tendencies in multi- 
regional models. 
In section 4 some numerical results of effectiveness analyses 
using 14 multiregional models from various countries are presented. 
For a description of these models, see the summary descriptions 
in Rietveld (1981). A selection of specific policy areas will be 
made. Sections 4-6 will be devoted to three main fields of 
regional policy: government expenditures, stimulation of private 
investments, and investments in infrastructure. The main empha- 
sis is on the effects of these instruments on economic growth, 
income, and employment. Some models also yield effects of other 
objectives, but - for the ease of presentation - these effects 
will not be reported here. 
4. GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Some conclusions of model results and simulations are pre- 
served in this section. The main focus is on the effectiveness 
of policies in which government revenues and expenditures play 
an important role. In general, it turns out to be almost impos- 
sible to draw inferences about the statistical validity of the 
results, since no model provides information on these aspects. 
For ease of presentation, a representative sample of models 
will be treated here. The presentation is based on the results 
of NRIES, MAG, IDIOM, a version of MRIO, and MEPA. All informa- 
tion has been provided by the model-builders. 
NRIES has been used to analyze the effects of a revision 
of the financial flows between the national (federal) and 
regional (state and local) authorities (see Ballard et al. 1980). 
The revised system assumes grants that are proportional to the 
population of the regions. The sum of the grants remains the 
same in the reference case and the policy variant. The redis- 
tribution of grants may give rise to a considerable increase or 
decrease in grants (for many regions a change of 10 to 20 per- 
cent). The long-run effects of the redistribution on per-capita 
income in the regions are relatively small (in most cases a 
change of less than 1%). The interregional inequality in per- 
capita incomes, measured by means of the coefficient of varia- 
tion, decreases from 0.1374 to 0.1359. Since NRIES is not a 
top-down model, it also yields results for the effects on the 
national economy. The redistribution gives rise to an increase 
of 132,000 man-years in the long-run, which indicates that high 
multiplier states gain more than low multiplier states. 
Another application of NRIES concerns the effects of a 
uniform increase in federal expenditures (partially covered by 
some uniform tax increases) on the regional economies (see 
Ballard and Wendling 1980). The national effect is an average 
employment growth of 1 percent per year. The regional varia- 
tions in the effects of the policy package are substantial: when 
the USA is partitioned into 8 clusters of states, the yearly 
regional employment growth can be calculated by means of the above- 
mentioned effectiveness analysis and it varies between 0.2 percent 
and 2;8 percent. 
The second model d i scussed  here  is  t h e  MAG model. The MAG 
model has  been used f o r  an impact a n a l y s i s  of a  s p a t i a l  r e d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of government a c t i v i t y  ( s e e  !4ilne e t  a l .  1980) .  I n  t h e  
r e fe rence  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  s h a r e  of t h e  nor thern  t i e r  of t h e  USA 
i n  government product ion d e c l i n e s  from 37.1 pe rcen t  t o  36.9 per-  
c e n t  i n  a  ten-year  pe r iod .  I n  t h e  p o l i c y  v a r i a n t ,  an i n c r e a s e  
of t h i s  s h a r e  t o  39.8 pe rcen t  has  been formulated.  The impl ica-  
t i o n s  of  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  f o r  g ros s  r e g i o n a l  p roduct ion  a r e  repre-  
sen ted  i n  Table 6 .  
Table  6 .  Regional impacts of a  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of government 
a c t i v i t y .  
--- - 
yea r ly  growth r a t e  of g r o s s  r eg iona l  
p roduct  
no r the rn  t i e r  rest of n a t i o n a l  
t h e  n a t i o n  
r e f e r e n c e  s o l u t i o n  2.5 3.3 2.9 
p o l i c y  v a r i a n t  2.7 3.0 2.9 
W e  may conclude from Table 6 t h a t  a  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  favor  
of t h e  no r the rn  t i e r  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a r educ t ion  of d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  r e g i o n a l  growth r a t e s .  The model does n o t  a l low an a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  impacts on n a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y ,  s i n c e  t h e  sum of t h e  
r eg iona l  v a r i a b l e s  i s  made t o  co inc ide  wi th  f o r e c a s t s  of t h e  
n a t i o n a l  va lues  from t h e  d r i v i n g  n a t i o n a l  model. 
The nex t  model d i scussed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  I DI OM .  One of 
t h e  p o l i c y  s imula t ions  wi th  I D I O M  concerns t h e  d i r e c t ,  i n d i r e c t ,  
and induced e f f e c t s  o f  a  c u t  i n  m i l i t a r y  expor t s  ( s e e  Dresch and 
Updegrove 1980) .  The n a t i o n a l  decrease  i n  employment i s  0.7 per-  
c e n t .  When t h e  USA i s  p a r t i t i o n e d  i n t o  13 c l u s t e r s  of s t a t e s ,  
t h e  r e g i o n a l  decrease '  v a r i e s  from 0.2 t o  1.0 pe rcen t .  Two com- 
pensatory programs have been devised :  a  pub l i c  works program 
wi th  emphasis on t h e  mostly heav i ly  a f f e c t e d  reg ions  and a  uniform 
reduc t ion  i n  t h e  l a b o r  t a x  r a t e .  I n  both cases  t h e  dec rease  i n  
employment can be offset at the national level. When the second 
compensatory program is employed, regional variations persist, 
however (the change in regional employment varies from -0.3 to 
+ 0.3 percent). 
Not surprisingly, it appears that the main industries to 
suffer from the reduction in exports are not the industries 
benefiting from the compensatory measures. Therefore, the 
outcomes of the simulations rely heavily on the assumption of 
a flexible labor market (large occupational mobility and elas- 
tic supply). This is obviously due to the fact that IDIOM is 
a demand-oriented model. 
Now a specific version of MRIO will be discussed. This 
version has been used to study the effects of various tax and 
income redistribution measures (see Golladay and Haveman 1977). 
It is the version developed at the Institute for Research on 
Poverty (IRP). In the IRP version, much attention is paid to 
income distribution aspects; for example, consumption functions 
have been specified for 7 income classes; labor requirements 
for 114 occupational categories are included. 
The model has been used to identify the impacts of a redis- 
tribution of incomes by means of a family assistance plan and 
a negative income tax. In a regional perspective, this means 
that the southern part of the USA receives large net transfers 
at the expense of other parts of the USA. One of the main con- 
clusions of the study is that the transfers lead to a certain 
reduction in interregional income inequalities, but the produc- 
tion shifts resulting from the transfers are substantially less 
equalizing, since, as a result of the interregional trade pattern, 
a substantial part of consumption in the South is produced in 
other regions. Another conclusion of the study is that the 
income transfers give rise to an increase in aggregate demand 
in the national economy (due to differences in the propensity to 
consume between income classes). In some policy variants an 
increase of 120,000 jobs has been shown. 
In this section some attention is given to policy studies 
with the MEPA model. MEPA was originally designed as a 
single-region model for Massachusetts (USA), but at present the 
model i s  supplemented by a p a r t i t i o n i n g  i n t o  5 sub-regions  ( c f .  
Treyz 1980; Treyz e t  a l .  1980; and Treyz and Duguay 1980 ) .  
Although ou r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  based on t h e  s i n g l e - r e g i o n  v e r s i o n  
o f  MEPA, t h e  model i s  i nc luded  h e r e  because  it sheds  l i g h t  on 
impor tan t  p o i n t s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  covered by t h e  o t h e r  p o l i c y  s t u d i e s  
r e p o r t e d .  
I n  MEPA a  c r u c i a l  e lement  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  s i m u l a t i o n s  concerns  
t h e  e f f e c t s  on wages and p r i c e s .  For example, i n  a  s t u d y  of  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d  c o n t r a c t s  i n  Massachu- 
se t t s ,  t h e  model g i v e s  rise t o  t h e  conc lu s ion  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  i s  
approx imate ly  2 . 8  times t h e  d i r e c t  employment e f f e c t .  I n  t h e  
f o u r t h  y e a r ,  t h i s  number h a s  decreased  t o  1.7.  
The r ea son  f o r  t h e  d e c r e a s e  i s  t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  l e a d s  
t o  a  t i g h t e r  l a b o r  market  and hence t o  h i g h e r  wages. T h i s  g i v e s  
r ise  t o  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  between labor and c a p i t a l  and t o  a reduc- 
t i o n  o f  inves tment  i n  t h e  p e r t a i n i n g  r eg ion .  I n  a n o t h e r  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n  o f  MEPA t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  w e l f a r e  payments o f  
400 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  Massachuset ts  have been ana lyzed  (see 
Treyz and Duguay 1980) .  F i f t y  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i s  covered 
by an i n c r e a s e  i n  p e r s o n a l  income t a x ,  t h e  o t h e r  f i f t y  p e r c e n t  
comes from f e d e r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  The sho r t - run  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  
i s  an i n c r e a s e  i n  employment of  16,790 jobs  i n  Massachuse t t s .  
The long-run e f f e c t  ( a f t e r  10 y e a r s )  i s  a d e c r e a s e  of  3,170 
j o b s ,  t h e  reason  be ing  t h e  above-mentioned s u b s t i t u t i o n  and 
s p a t i a l  r e - a l l o c a t i o n  e f f e c t s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  t e s t  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  outcomes f o r  
feed-back e f f e c t s  from t h e  l a b o r  marke t s ,  MEPA h a s  been r e r u n  
w i th  f i x e d  wage l e v e l s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  comple te ly  d i f f e r e n t  
e f f e c t  i s  found, namely an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  long-run o f  16,760 
jobs  i n  Massachuset ts .  T h i s  is a  clear i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s e n s i t i v i t y  of  t h e  outcomes o f  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  models. These r e s u l t s  once more demons t ra te  t h e  neces-  
s i t y  o f  a  c a r e f u l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n a l y s i s  i n  r e g i o n a l  models. 
These p o l i c y  e x e r c i s e s  and s i m u l a t i o n s  g i v e  rise t o  t h e  
fo l l owing  o b s e r v a t i o n s :  
1. Some models (NRIES and the IRP version of MRIO) allow 
one to study the effects of an interregional redis- 
tribution of income or- government expenditures on 
national efficiency (cf. the matrices Arn in Table 5). 
The common idea that there is a trade-off between 
national efficiency and interregional equity is not 
confirmed by these models. These models give rise 
to the conclusion that - given the present situation - 
it is possible to increase both national efficiency 
and interregional equity. 
2. Uniform policies at the national level may give rise 
to substantially varying effects for the regions (see 
NRIES, IDIOM, and the IRP version of WIO). This is 
a clear indication that the Anr part of Table 5 should 
not be neglected in regional policy analysis. 
3. In the policy analyses, little systematic attention 
is paid to the uncertainties in conclusions concerning 
policy effects. An exception is the experiment with 
the MEPA model in which the sensitivity for the assump- 
tions of fixed wages is tested. 
4. Some experiments (IDIOM, the IRP version of MRIO) are 
based on the method of comparative statics. The 
obvious disadvantaqe is that it is not possible to 
assess the magnitude of effects in the short and the 
longer run. As indicated by an experiment with the 
MEPA model, short- and long-run effects may differ 
significantly. 
5. IDIOM and the IRP version of MRIO are pure demand-driven 
models. Hence, they are based on the assumption that 
there are no serious bottlenecks on the supply side (for 
example the labor market). In cases where this assump- 
tion is not realistic, one may question whether the out- 
comes of the simulations are meaningful. 
6. In all cases, the experiments concern ex ante analyses 
-- 
of policy measures. 
5. STIMULATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
The effects of stimulating private investments is the 
subject of the present section. Here again, a representative 
sample of models will be discussed. The results of REGAM, the 
Suzuku et al. model, RENA, MACEDOINE, and REGINA are presented. 
REGAM has been used for an -._ ex post analysis of the effec- 
* 
tiveness of regional investment subsidies in the Netherlands. 
One important finding is that the effectiveness depends heavily 
on the macro-economic conditions. Consider, for exam~le, the 
effect of a one percent reduction in the price of investments 
in a region compared to the average price reduction over the 
regions on the discrepancy between the regional and national 
growth rate of manufacturing employment. This effect declined 
from 0.40 percent a year in the fifties to about 0.15 percent 
a year in the seventies. 
In another ex post analysis, REGAM has been used to deter- 
-
mine the extent to which investments for which a subsidy has 
been received would have been realized without the subsidy. In 
the period from 1973-1979, 20,000 jobs were created in connection 
with subsidized investments. REGAM indicates that approximately 
9,500 jobs (40-50 percent) would not have been realized without 
subsidies. In the model no attention is paid to indirect and 
induced effects. Hence, a certain underestimation of the ~olicy 
effect may have occurred. 
REGAM is a top-down model. This means that the regional 
investment subsidies only influence the regional distribution 
of employment, but not the national volume. Consequently, the 
9,500 jobs created in the stimulation regions have been realized 
at the expense of 9,500 jobs in regions without subsidies. In 
Table 7 the positive, negative, and net effects per region are 
represented. 
The fourth row contains the actual development of industrial 
employment during the period considered. Clearly the net effects 
of the subsidies are .small compared with the effects of autonomous 
* 
See the official government document: Nota Regionaal- 
Sociaal Economisch Beleid, 1981-1985 (1981); see also Van Delft 
and Suyker (1981). 

variables. The investment subsidies influenced only marginally 
the development of regional employment. 
The fifth row indicates the development of regional indus- 
trial employment that would arise if the national rate of decline 
had been applied to all regions in a uniform way. . 
In the sixth row the regional component in the actual deve- 
lopment has been presented (row 6 is defined as the difference 
between rows 4 and 5) . When comparing rows 3 and 6, it is con- 
cluded that part of the relatively favorable development of the 
South may be ascribed to the investment subsidy. 
For the North and the East, the inferrence is that the posi- 
tive net effect of the subsidy is hardlysufficient or is insuf- 
ficient to counterbalance the negative effects of other variables. 
The next model discussed here has been designed by Suzuki 
et al. (1978), who have analyzed the effects of policies aiming 
at industrial decentralization by means of congestion taxes in 
highly industrialized regions and subsidies in less industri- 
alized regions. The taxes are imposed on factory floor space 
in the industrial sector. The taxes and subsidies are included 
in the model by means of the variables determining regional 
investment. The effects of the policy measures are represented 
in Table 8, which indicates that the measures lead to a certain 
dispersion of industrial activity from the main industrial center 
(Kanto) to the rest of the country. The measures are not strong 
enough to prevent Kanto from increasing its share, when compared 
with the situation in 1970. This conclusion is striking when one 
knows that in the reference solution certain dispersion measures 
have already been taken into account (for example, a tax on 
environmental pollution). 
Next, the RENA model is briefly discussed. According to the 
RENA model the short- and medium-term effects of an investment 
stimulus on regional employment are very small (see Bogaert et 
al. 1979). The model-users report that this can be attributed 
to the fact that,in the pasttinvestment aid has been used pre- 
dominantly for a rationalization of production, instead of for an 
extension of the production capacity. This behavior in the past 
Table 8. Impacts of industrial decentralization policies 
in Japan. 
i n d u s t r i a l  p roduc t i on  i n  b i l l i o n s  yen (and i n p e r c e n t a g e s )  
r e g i o n  1970 1985( re fe rence  s o l u t i o n )  1985 ( p o l i c y  v a r i a n t )  
Kant o 64,500 (39.2)  160,600 (40.7) 156,400 (39.6) 
Japan 164,400 (100.0) 394,900 (100.0) 395,000 (100.0) 
has largely influenced the estimation results and hence the 
conclusions of the effects of investment aid on employment. 
In MACEDOINE, gross investments as such are assumed to be 
exogenous. Therefore, in a strict sense an analysis of stimu- 
lation policies cannot be carried out. The model is interesting, 
however, since much attention is paid to investment multipliers 
in space and time (see Despontin 1980)  . 
In short-term multiplier of gross regional investments on 
gross regional production varies considerably among the 8 regions: 
they range from 0.53 to 1.08.  This may be due to large differences 
in the economic structure of these regions. The corresponding 
interim multipliers increase considerably over several years. 
Eventually, these multipliers decrease because of substitution 
processes induced by wage increases. Cumulative interim multi- 
pliers or total multipliers have not been computed. This is 
related to the fact that several eigenvalues of MACEDOINE are 
substantially higher than 1 ,  giving rise to a divergent system. 
This result casts doubt on the relevance of the model in simula- 
tions for a long run. 
The REGINA model has been used to flnd the impacts on the 
national economy of various regional investment strategies (see 
Courbis 1 9 7 9 ) .  For each of the five REGINA regions, a gradual 
increase of two percentage points in the share of manufacturing 
investments that the region holds in the total manufacturing 
investment is considered for the period 1970-1980. This 
increase is compensated for by a decrease of investments in 
the other regions with an equal decrease in relative terms for 
each of these. This redistribution of investments would give 
rise to an increase of approximately 50,000 jobs .inmanufacturing 
in the stimulation region. 
Since REGINA is not a top-down model, it can be used to 
assess the effects of the various alternatives on the national 
economy. It appears that these effects vary considerably (see 
Table 9). For example, a stimulation of the Paris region 
assuming rapid national economic growth gives rise to a decrease 
in 1980 of 132,000 jobs in the total employment pool, while a 
similar stimulus in Eastern and Northern France give rise to an 
increase in 1980 of 40,000 jobs. This difference is due to 
the tight labor market in Paris and the dependence of wage deve- 
lopment in other regions on the wages in Paris. 
Table 9. Effects of regional investment policy (1970-1980) on 
the national economy in 1980, given alternative 
assumptions concerning national economic growth. 
impact on national impact on national 
stimulation region employment price level 
(measured in jobs) (measured in per- 
cent points) 
E: 
0  0 
.,-I .,-I JZ Paris -132,000 
u E U  
1 6 0 3  
c c o  Western and South- - 31,000 
a u m  
-4 aJ 
a Western France 
5' 
h Eastern and Northern + 40,000 
France 
d 
rd 
c Par is - 1  12,000 
0  
~'i-4 
u . u  Western and South- + 4,000 
C E U  
0  3  
W C O  Western France 
J J O k  l d u m  
k aJ 
a~ -Eastern and Northern + 31,000 
a 
2 France 
An interesting result of REGINA is that the effects of 
regional policy depend considerably on the assumptions about 
autonomous variables. For example, when more moderate national 
economic growth is assumed, the effects also tend to be smaller 
and may sometimes show a change in sign. This is illustrated in 
Table 9 by the employment effect of an investment policy in favor 
of Western and South-Western France that is negative in the strong 
growth variant and positive in the moderate growth variant. 
These policy experiments give rise to the following obser- 
vations: 
The simulation with REGAM is the only -- ex post experi- 
ment in this section. This experiment gives rise to 
the conclusion that a substantial part (40-50 percent 
of the jobs created in connection with investment 
subsidies in the Netherlands from 1973-1979 would not 
have been created without subsidies. Another conclu- 
sion from REGAM, which is also supported by Suzuki's 
model and the RENA model, is that the effects of sub- 
sidies are small compared with the effects of autono- 
mous variables. This means that - given the level of 
subsidies considered - the spatial distribution of 
investments is only marginally influenced by the 
subsidies. 
2. From the experiments with REGAM and REGINA, it appears 
that. the effectiveness of investment subsidies depends 
considerably on national economic conditions. In 
periods of rapid economic growth, the effectiveness is, 
in general, greater. 
3. In the simulation with REGINA, attention is paid to 
the effects of an interregional distribution of 
investments on the national economy (see matrix hrn 
in Table 5). These effects may be substantial. 
4. In three of the five simulations, investments are 
stimulated by means of subsidies, which are modeled 
via the user cost of capital. In the other two cases, 
no indication of how the investments are stimulated 
is given; one simply assumes a given shift in regional 
investments. If one wants to study the effectiveness 
of subsidies in the lasttwocases, additional information 
about the influence of subsidies on investments would 
be required. 
5. All models are based on the assumption that invest- 
ments resulting from stimulation measures are - on 
the average - not different from other investments 
in a certain sector. This assumption may give rise 
to questionable results. For example, a common argu- 
ment against investment subsidies is that they are on 
the average used by less efficient firms. This gives 
rise to a higher than average probability that these 
firms might close down within a fairly short period. 
Such an argument is not taken into account in the 
models. As far as the argument is real, the models 
give rise to an overestimation of the effectiveness 
of investment subsidies. 
6. It is a well-known fact that modeling investment 
behavior is a difficult task and that statistical 
tests of estimated relationships in this field often 
give rise to less satisfactory results. Therefore, 
it is disappointing that in the simulations little 
attention is paid to the measure of uncertainty of 
the outcomes. 
7. In two cases (MACEDOINE and RENA) , the economy is 
treated as one uniform sector. Consequently, these 
models are less adequate for an analysis of subsidies 
to specific industries. 
6. INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
As a final example of effectiveness analysis, the impact 
of public infrastructure is examined. Investments in infra- 
structure are part of government expenditures , which have 
already been dealt with in section 4. A separate treatment 
of infrastructure investments is justified, however, since these 
instruments give rise to effects that are often absent in the 
case of consumptive expenditures (see Biehl et al. 1980, and 
Nijkamp 1981). They are not only a component of final demand, 
but may also add to regional productivity and the attractiveness 
and development potential of regions for productive or residen- 
tial purposes. The latter effect will be called the attractive- 
ness effect. In this section, the results of BALAMO, a model of 
Fukuchi, RENA, MRMI, and REGAL are presented. 
In BALAMO, special attention is paid to investments in 
road infrastructure. The two production factors determining 
regional production are the regional labor force and the 
regional road stock (this is evidently a rather restricted 
production theory). The production function has been speci- 
fied such that considerable substitution possibilities exist 
between these production factors. 
In one of the simulations (see Kawashima 1977), a 100 
percent growth rate per 5-year period of qross road investment 
in a particular region is assumed, while for the remaining 
regions a 50 percent growth rate is taken. Gross investments 
are devoted to the replacement or repair of the existing stock 
(depending on the intensity of use in the previous period) and 
the extension of the regional road network. In this simulation 
the share of the particular region in the total production of 
mineral resources increased from 6 percent to 20 ~ercent after 
* 
six periods. The reliability of this result is questionable. 
The structure of the model is not very suitable for an analysis 
of 30 years or more, especially since no attention is paid 
to the formation of private capital stock. 
In another Japanese model (built by Fukuchi 1978), consid- 
erable attention is paid to the role of infrastructure. Infra- 
structure plays a role in the equations explaining the regional 
* 
Note that in this case reference values for the instru- 
ments have not been given (for example by assuming a uniform 
growth rate of instruments of 50 percent in all regions). The 
reported result for the share of regional production has been 
compared with the initial situation and not with the result of 
a reference policy. Consequently, in a strict sense, this 
experiment does not give any information about the effective- 
ness of the road investments. 
p o p u l a t i o n  ( s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  c a p i t a l )  and r e g i o n a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
l e v e l s  i n  v a r i o u s  s e c t o r s  ( c o l l e c t i v e  a g r i c u l t u r a l ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  
and t e r t i a r y  c a p i t a l ) .  The e l a s t i c i t i e s  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n s  a r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e .  For example, an  i n c r e a s e  of 1 
p e r c e n t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  c a p i t a l  f o r  t h e  t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r  i n  a  
c e r t a i n  r e g i o n  g i v e s  rise t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n a l  
p rod u c t i on  i n  t h a t  s e c t o r  o f  0 .3  p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  same y e a r .  
I n  t h i s  model no a t t e n t i o n  i s  p a i d  t o  t h e  r o l e  o f  i n v e s t -  
ments i n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a s  a  f i n a l  demand component. T h e i r  
o n l y  f u n c t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e g i o n a l  p roduc t i on  
c a p a c i t y .  T h i s  t r e a t m e n t  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t x e  can a l s o  be  
found i n  B A L M .  
The impac t s  o f  p u b l i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  can a l s o  be  i d e n t i -  
f i e d  i n  RENA. A r e s u l t  o f  t h e  RENA model is  t h a t  a  r e a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  p u b l i c  i nves tmen t s  among r e g i o n s  h a s  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  e f f e c t s  
on r e g i o n a l  growth and employment (see Bogaer t  e t  a l .  1979) .  
I n  t h i s  model, p u b l i c  i nves tmen t s  a r e  t r e a t e d  a s  an exogenous 
p a r t  o f  t o t a l  i nves tmen t s .  Hence, t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on employment 
can be  found i n  a  way s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  p rocedure  a p p l i e d  t o  p r i v a t e  
i nv e s tmen t s  (see s e c t i o n  5 ) .  Consequent ly ,  t h e  same e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  t h e  s m a l l  e x t e n t  of  t h e  e f f e c t s  can be g iven  h e r e  a s  i n  sec- 
t i o n  5. 
The MRMI model ha s  been used e x t e n s i v e l y  f o r  s t u d i e s  con- 
c e r n i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  changes i n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  networks  on 
r e g i o n a l  economies (see H a r r i s  1980, and Hilewick e t  a l .  1980) .  
One s t u d y  h a s  focussed  on t h e  e f f e c t s  of  b u i l d i n g  and upgrad ing  
highways and r a i l r o a d s  i n  P i t t  County, a  county  w i t h  approx i -  
mate ly  75,000 i n h a b i t a n t s  i n  North C a r o l i n a  (USA). The s h o r t -  
run  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  i nves t emtns  a r e  c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e :  d u r i n g  
t h e  y e a r s  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  employment ha s  i n c r e a s e d  by approx i -  
ma t e ly  1,200 jobs .  The long-run e f f e c t s  (10-15 y e a r s )  o f  
improved a c c e s s i b i l i t y  a r e  s m a l l  and n e g a t i v e :  t h e  model i n d i -  
c a t e s  a  d e c r e a s e  o f  40 j obs .  T h i s  means t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s  b e n e f i t  more from i n c r e a s e d  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t h a n  t h e  r e g i o n  
o f  inves tment  i t s e l f .  I n  a  s i m i l a r  c a s e  s t u d y  f o r  o t h e r  coun- 
t ies ,  a sma l l  b u t  p o s i t i v e  long-run e f f e c t  i s  found f o r  t h e  
r e g i o n  of  inves tment .  Obviously ,  t h e  MRMI model a l l ows  f o r  
both a positive and a negative sign for the long-run effects of 
investments in transportation on the pertaining region. The 
sign of the effect depends partially on the level of conges- 
tion in the transportation system, the existing spatial distri- 
bution of activities, and the size of the investment relative 
to the regional product. 
The effects of investments in transportation have been 
compared with the effects of investments in the communications 
sector (printing, computing machinery, broadcasting, etc.) 
in Pitt County. The conclusion is the investments in communi- 
cations, aiming at regional self-sufficiency, give rise to a 
smaller investment sum, but a larger number of jobs in the 
medium and longer term. This is due in part to the 
relatively low capital intensity of the communications sector. 
No indication is given of the policy measures to be taken to 
realize these investments in the private sector (see the fourth 
observation of section 5). 
Finally, the REGAL model is discussed. REGAL is based ' 
on the assumption that public capital is a necessary condition 
for production in the private sector (see Granholm 1981). Public 
capital is tied to the volume of private capital stock by the 
fixation of minimum requirement parameters. Thus, when the 
regional public capital stock is fixed, a limit is imposed on 
the extent to which the regional private stock can be used, and 
thus on regional production. Hence, when there is a shortage 
of public capital, public investments give rise to a proportional 
increase of production in the private sector. When there is no 
shortage of public capital, public investments have no direct 
effects on the level of production in the private sector. The 
following public sectors have been distinguished: child care 
and basic education, medical services, public administration 
(national and regional), transport and communications, housing 
stock, eletricity and water production, road capital. Regional 
public capital also plays a role in REGAL in the determination 
of the regional population. Given the level of regional public 
services, a constraint is imposed on the total population that 
can live in a region. 
The policy simulations give rise to the following obser- 
vations : 
1. In two out of the five models (RENA and MRMI) , atten- 
tion is paid to both the demand and the attractiveness 
effects of public investments. In the other three 
models, only attractiveness effects are dealt with. 
2. The atractiveness effects of public capital investments 
can be modeled in a direct and an indirect way. In 
MRMI the indirect approach is used. The effects of 
investments in transportation infrastructure on regional 
development are modeled by means of the ensuing reduc- 
tion in transport costs. In this case, the question of 
how transport costs are influenced by the investments 
has to be solved outside the model. In the other models 
a direct approach is used. The public stock plays an 
explicit role in these models, for example, via produc- 
tion functions. 
3. In the RENA, BALAMO, and Fukuchi models, substitutability 
between public capital and private production factors 
(labor or capital) is assumed. This is not the case 
with the REGAL model. In this model the notion of 
complementarity of private and public capital is 
fundamental. 
4. The level of disaggregation of the public sector differs 
substantially among the models. In RENA disaggregation 
does not take place; BALAMO deals only with road stock, 
in Fukuchi's model four general classes of public capital 
are distinguished; in REGAL the public sector is divided 
into eight groups. Obviously, a low level of disaggrega- 
tion hampers the analysis of the effects of specific 
public investment projects. 
5. In all models, attention is paid to the role of public 
investments for the behavior of private enterprises. 
Obviously public capital may also influence household 
behavior. For example, in REGAL and Fukuchi's model 
attention is paid to the influence of infrastructure 
on migration. 
6. The simulation with MRMI indicates that the short-run 
(demand) effects of investments in infrastructure may 
be completely different from longer-run (attractiveness) 
effects. This points to the importance of a dynamic 
analysis. 
7. No uniform conclusions can be drawn about the size of 
the attractiveness effects of investments. MRMI and 
RENA indicate small effects, whereas the other models 
give rise to the conclusion that substantial effects 
will arise. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the end of each of the preceding sections certain obser- 
vations have been put forward. In this section some conclusions 
of a more general nature are presented. 
In sections 4-6, the contributions of approximately 
one-third of the models included in the survey have 
been discussed with respect to the problem of instru- 
mental effectiveness. There are various reasons why 
the other models have not been discussed: some models 
are not yet fully operationa1,'some are not intended 
for policy studies, in some cases insufficient docu- 
mentation is available, etc. 
2 .  As a consequence of conclusion ( 1 ) , multiregional 
economic models do not allow definite conclusions 
with regard to policy debates concerning labor versus 
capital subsidies, work-to-workers or workers-to-work 
policies, the role of direct controls, etc. 
3. In some cases, more definite conclusions can be derived 
from model simulations: 
a. Given the present level of investment sub- 
sidies considered, the effects of subsidies 
are small compared with the effects of auto- 
nomous variables (observation 5 - 1 ) .  
b. The notion that there is a general trade-off 
between national efficiency and regional 
equity is not confirmed by the models. In 
various experiments it appears possible to 
increase efficiency and equity simultaneously 
(observations 4-1 and 5-3) . 
c. In various model experiments, uniform policies 
at the national level give rise to substan- 
tially varying effects for the regions (obser- 
vation 4-21 . 
4. In the experiments, insufficient attention is paid to 
uncertainties concerning instrumental effectiveness. 
Uncertainties may arise from sources such as the 
stochastic nature of parameters, specification errors, 
and uncertainties about the future development of 
autonomous variables. In some experiments the last 
source of uncertainties is treated (observation 5-2), 
but the other sources remain almost unmentioned (obser- 
vations 4-3 and 5-6) . 
5. Most studies of instrumental effectiveness of multi- 
regional models are of an -- ex ante nature (observations 
4-6 and 5-11. This may be a surprise, since there are 
various reasons why an - ex post analysis is easier to 
perform (see section 2). On the other hand, an -- ex post 
analysis may clearly give rise to less welcome results 
for both policy-makers and model-builders. 
6. Concerning the time span of the policy analyses, in 
general, it does not exceed 15 years. This means that 
multiregional economic models have only been used for 
short- and medium-run analyses up to now. Another 
finding is that the short- and medium-run effects 
of policy measures may differ considerably (observa- 
tions 4-4 and 6-6). This indicates that models that 
do not allow one to study short- and medium-run effects 
separately (e.g. static models) are less adequate for 
certain policy analyses. 
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